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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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NO. 44557
BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR 2014-2025

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Frangesh contends the district court abused its discretion because the sentence is
excessive and because it denied his ensuing motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35). He contends that a sufficient consideration of the mitigating facts in this
case, particularly when the additional information presented in support of the Rule 35 motion is
factored in, reveals that a more lenient sentence would better serve the goals of sentencing. As
such, this Court should reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand this
case for further proceedings on Mr. Frangesh’s Rule 35 motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Frangesh pled guilty to three counts of aggravated DUI following a car accident
which caused injuries to the three occupants of the other car, as well as to Mr. Frangesh himself.
(See R., p.107.) He explained his actions that night were the result of a relapse in his sobriety.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.6-7.) He expressed his remorse for his
actions and the impact they had on the occupants of the other car, and accepted there would be
consequences for those actions. (PSI, pp.7, 19; Tr., p.54, L.24 - p.55, L.7.) In exchange for his
pleas, the State agreed to not pursue a persistent violator enhancement and to recommend
concurrent sentences. (Tr., p.8, Ls.15-25.) Ultimately, the district court imposed and executed
concurrent unified prison sentences of fifteen years, with six years fixed. (Tr., p.63, Ls.3-6;
R., p.108.)
Mr. Frangesh filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 timely from the judgment of conviction,
in which he requested leniency. (R., p.114.) Specifically, defense counsel argued the district
court should reconsider the fixed portion of the sentence because a shorter term in that regard
would allow Mr. Frangesh to more quickly earn the opportunity for release on parole and begin
contributing to society and making payments on restitution.

(Tr., p.66, Ls.17-21, p.67,

Ls.12-17.) Defense counsel presented additional letters of support of Mr. Frangesh, and the
authors of several of those letters appeared and gave oral statements as well.

(Tr., p.65,

L.23 - p.77, L.8; PSI, pp.52-53.) The district court denied the Rule 35 motion, explaining the
information presented in support of the motion did not change its mind about the appropriateness
of the sentences as originally imposed. (Tr., p.84, L.14 - p.85, L.4; R., pp.135-36.)
Mr. Frangesh tried to file a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction, but that
appeal (Docket No. 42794) was dismissed as untimely filed. (See R., pp.107, 120-22, 137.) He
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also tried to file a notice of appeal after the denial of his Rule 35 motion, but that notice was not
filed until after a motion to reconsider the denial of the Rule 35 motion filed by his attorney was
resolved. (See R., pp.138, 145-50.) As a result, that appeal (Docket No. 43264) was also
dismissed. (See R., p.166.) However, Mr. Frangesh won back his right to appeal the conviction
and sentence, as well as the denial of his Rule 35 motion, after he filed a petition for postconviction relief. (See R., p.167.) Accordingly, he filed a new notice of appeal in this case
which was premature to the district court reentering the judgment of conviction after the postconviction case concluded. (See R., pp.167-69; Order to Withdraw Conditional Dismissal and
Suspend Appeal, dated July 24, 2017.) As such, this notice of appeal is timely. I.A.R. 17(e)(2).

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Frangesh’s Rule 35
motion.

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences
When a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in that decision, the defendant must show that, in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson,
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130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (articulating the
standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion).
The protection of society is the primary objective the sentencing court should consider.
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence which protects society
and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is influenced by
each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau,
124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that
rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal
sanction.” State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
A sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in the record reveals a more lenient
sentence would better serve all the goals of sentencing. Mr. Frangesh was 52 years old at the
time of the initial sentencing and had a steady history of gainful employment. (PSI, pp.3, 17.)
Thus, he has shown an ability to be a contributing member of society.
Additionally, this was only his second DUI conviction, and the prior DUI was from 1999.
(See PSI, pp.7-13.) To that point, Mr. Frangesh acknowledged he struggles with alcohol abuse
and had been participating in the AA program, but in this case, he had not properly addressed his
symptoms. (See Tr., p.55, L.18 - p.56, L.1.) He acknowledged that his failure to properly deal
with those symptoms had caused harm to others, a result for which he expressed his remorse and
the consequences for which he accepted responsibility. (See Tr., p.54, L.24 - p.55, L.17.) He
also expressed his rededication to gaining and maintaining his sobriety, and presented evidence
of a support network to help him in that process. (See Tr., p.56, Ls.7-15; PSI, pp.49-50.) To that
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point, the substance abuse evaluation conducted as part of the PSI recommended Mr. Frangesh
participate in a residential treatment program which would allow him to stabilize, and ultimately,
return to being a productive member of society. (See PSI, p.32.)
As such, a sufficient consideration of these factors reveals the sentence initially imposed
was excessive and that a more lenient sentence, such as the one defense counsel recommended
(an underlying aggregate term of ten years with only three years fixed, with the district court
retaining jurisdiction) would better serve all the goals of sentencing. Specifically, it would allow
Mr. Frangesh the opportunity to begin his rehabilitation process sooner, and so, more quickly
return to being a contributing member of society. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by
initially imposing excessive sentences in this case.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Frangesh’s Rule 35 Motion
“The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). This is because a motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence
pursuant to Rule 35(b) is essentially a plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence
originally imposed was unduly severe.

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

Additionally, when petitioning for a sentence reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must
show his sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information presented to the
sentencing court. Id.
Mr. Frangesh presented additional information in support of his Rule 35 motion
expounding on the mitigating factors which are discussed in Section I, supra. Specifically, he
presented more letters, as well as testimony from various individuals, which provided more
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information about Mr. Frangesh’s character, his rededication to treatment, and the continuing
support Mr. Frangesh had from those witnesses. (Tr., p.69, L.14 - p.77, L.12.) A sufficient
consideration of all the mitigating factors in light of that new information further reveals that a
more lenient sentence would better serve all the goals of sentencing. As such, the district court
abused its discretion by not reducing Mr. Frangesh’s excessive sentences pursuant to his Rule
35(b) motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Frangesh respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for further
proceedings on his Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 27th day of July, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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